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PROMOTING DEMOCRACY BACKWARDS: LOOKING FORWARD 
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A typology of the diverse ways in which international dimensions of democratization and democracy 
assistance itself actually retard and undermine democracy’s progress around the world provides a 
salutary response to currently fashionable ideas of democracy promotion as a world value. The 
detailed typology presented here offers an aid to thinking and practice concerning what approaches to 
take to the international promotion of democracy in the future. But as is the case with the already well 
established idea of ‘democratization backwards’, so it is equally true when looking forward that 
‘promoting democracy backwards’ implies no one determinate eventual outcome. The analysis 
implicitly raises the question whether the time has now come not just for the practice of democracy 
promotion to widen its lens but for studies of it to broaden their horizons too.  
 
The idea and practice of international democracy promotion has gained considerable 
attention over the last few years. There is now both a substantial multinational 
industry involved in promoting democracy abroad and a significant accumulation of 
scholarly studies examining the performance. In the United States President George 
W. Bush has given impetus to the cause of promoting freedom and democracy in the 
Middle East especially, as a major plank in his administration’s strategy for 
countering international terrorism. In Europe the effectiveness of the European 
Union’s application of democratic conditionalities (the so called Copenhagen criteria) 
to accession candidates from post-communist Central and Eastern Europe has been 
widely acknowledged.  There is now an attempt by the EU to adapt the lessons and 
repeat the democratic gains from its enlargement strategy in the context of a new 
‘European neighbourhood’ policy towards countries that will never be considered 
candidates for membership. In March 2006 the United Nations launched its 
Democracy Fund, with 26 countries pledging an initial total of US$41 million for the 
initiative. All in all, just as Amartya Sen said at the end of the last millennium – in a 
much repeated claim – that democracy is now a ‘universal value’,  so a more recent 
suggestion by Michael McFaul declares democracy promotion is a world value, albeit 
not yet a universal value.1 According to Sen, democracy’s status as a universally 
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relevant system is now accepted and democracy is desired throughout the world, even 
though some dictators still remain to be convinced. And for McFaul the promotion of 
democracy is now an international norm; the normative burden has shifted to those 
not interested in advocating democracy promotion.  
 
However, democratization still faces an uphill struggle in many parts of the 
world even today. Ipso facto the same is true of democracy promotion. Moreover, 
many of the adverse factors originate in the international environment and they 
include some that can be found within the democracy promotion industry itself – as a 
comprehensive impact evaluation would reveal. The spotlight should concentrate not 
just on the rights and responsibilities of the world community of democracies to 
intervene on the side of democracy against enemies inside countries that would erode 
or destroy it from within.2 It needs to be trained as well on threats that international 
dimensions of democratization and the international system pose to democracy and 
democratization. Accordingly this paper offers a typology of anti-democracy 
promotion.  
 
Democracy Gained and Democracy Lost 
 
The wording of ‘promoting democracy backwards’ takes its cue from Rose and Shin’s 
insightful thesis on ‘democratization backwards’.3 That thesis claimed that in many 
contemporary instance countries seem to be trying to install competitive elections 
without first ensuring that certain basic institutions of the modern state are in place, 
most notably the rule of law, civil society institutions and accountability of the 
government. The authors argued that this departed from the sequence by which liberal 
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democracy came about in the longest established democracies, where the rule of law 
(and economic growth) preceded competitive elections.  
 
The idea of ‘promoting democracy backwards’ resonates in two senses, then, 
while leaving open the question of what kind of future it ultimately heralds for 
democratization, just as Rose and Shin allow that ‘democratization backwards’ might 
be a ‘low level equilibrium trap’ that could lead either to ‘broken-back democracies’ 
or alternatively the repudiation of free elections or, yet again might even be followed 
by completion of the democratization process. Rather this paper argues first there are 
different kinds of external factor that make a negative contribution to democratization, 
and work against the efforts to promote democracy. They push in the direction of de-
democratization or democratic regression. But second, in as much as these factors 
seem to make it more difficult for societies to undertake and sustain democratic 
political reform, they bring to mind the old idea that democratization must involve 
struggle, or is the product of struggle.4 Just as that idea does not necessarily mean 
violent struggle (as in the bloody revolutions that overthrew autocratic regimes) 
neither does the idea’s most usual formulation make it essential for the enemies of 
democracy to be ‘foreign devils’, except in case of wars of national liberation. In 
those wars national political self-determination has frequently been the occasion for 
democratic opening, but just as often has ended up giving priority to formal political 
independence over – and at the expense of  - democracy. Nevertheless, the view that 
process matters is quite fundamental. Process influences the kind and level of 
democracy or ‘democraticness’ that emerges and/or the sense of public ownership and 
commitment to upholding the democratic gains, especially by engaging the mass of 
the people, instead of just relying on a cosy agreement among leading elites, as in so 
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called ‘pacted transitions’. Democracy handed on a plate from the outside may be as 
inauspicious a foundation as is the imposition of democracy by external force, even 
though some apparent success stories can be found for both.  Democracy can easily be 
lost, owing to popular apathy, indifference or simply the absence of initial conditions 
that are most conducive to democratic sustainability. In contrast democracy that is 
gained in the face of adversity – international adversity included – might turn out to 
be more secure. 
 
The difference between ‘promoting democracy backwards’ and the more 
familiar ‘democratization backwards’ then is not simply one between exogenous 
(international) and endogenous (domestic) dimensions of political change. It is a 
difference between on the one side saying something about the climate in which (the 
process by which) change is made, and on the other side claiming that certain political 
steps must come first (for example the rule of law). Promoting democracy backwards 
makes a statement about how democracy is generated – or impeded or set back – and 
not about a specific order in which challenges must be addressed. However the final 
outcome cannot be known with any certainty. So the notion that by causing 
democratization impulses to ‘go back to basics’  - the important struggle against 
adversity - today’s anti-democracy promotion might actually be making a positive if 
accidental and indirect contribution to democratization in the longer term, will not be 
explored further here.  
 
Instead the emphasis here is on why the current hubris surrounding democracy 
promotion and protection (sometimes referred to as DPP) should be tempered by a 
sensitivity to forces of democracy prevention (DP) and democracy destruction (DD) 
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that are present in the international system. At minimum there are implications for 
how DPP endeavours should be reconstructed if they are to maximise their chances of 
success.  
 
But first it is important to note that by democracy here is meant the kind of 
democracy that most DPP activities aim to bring about, namely western-style liberal 
democracy at most. By drawing attention to democracy promotion backwards the 
argument does not set out to criticise DPP on the grounds that its model of democracy 
frustrates – intentionally or otherwise – progress towards some more radical form of 
democracy. That is a criticism other writers have made, for instance William 
Robinson who portrays US democracy promotion especially as aiming to introduce 
elitist democracy, or polyarchy, in order to head off grass-roots demands for more 
‘progressive’ democratic changes – changes that would be less subservient to 
transnational capital, and more productive of real empowerment.5  The plausibility of 
Robinson’s and the many similar accounts is for readers to judge: it is compatible 
with but different from the arguments about promoting democracy backwards. The 
same observation could be made about notions of and demands for democracy that are 
so locally and culturally specific that they owe little to the ideas of the international 
democracy promoters or their western-based left-leaning intellectual critics. 
 
Secondly, promoting democracy backwards is not a reference to ideational 
contestation and negative social learning manifested by the rival appeal exerted by 
those other belief systems that reject all forms of democracy, liberal or otherwise. An 
example would be those that place the sovereignty of God or divine scripture above 
the sovereignty of the people and the corollary that rule must be by consent of the 
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ruled, and so bestow special powers and political authority on select (often self-
selected) interpreters of the holy writ. This along with extreme anti-democratic forms 
of nationalism and Marxism and Maoism in a few remaining outposts like Nepal 
continue to have their groups of supporters. But the question of whether they pose a 
significant threat to democratization in terms of a sustained ability to capture the 
hearts and minds of people is, while generally discounted in the propositions that 
advance ‘democracy as universal value’, not the subject of the discussion here. That 
subject is a typology for promoting democracy backwards, intended as a guide to 
rethinking how international actors should go about trying to support democratization 
in the future. 
 
But before moving to such a typology, three useful distinctions should be 
made first: between active and passive democracy promotion; between direct and 
indirect promotion; and between democracy promotion and democracy assistance. 
 
Active and Passive, Direct and Indirect Promotion and Assistance 
 
The idea of promoting democracy has both an active and a passive sense, 
corresponding to the distinction between the promotion of democracy and democracy 
being promoted. The active sense comprises deliberate actions undertaken with a view 
to achieving a democratic purpose. It draws attention to which actors in the 
international democracy promotion ‘industry’ are doing what, and how, as well as to 
what effect. The passive sense orients more towards how far democratic trends are 
occurring in prospective, emerging and new democracies, and whether the trends are 
being influenced by external forces, outside actors and international events. 
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Intentionality is central to the active sense of promoting democracy. But in the passive 
sense democratic impulses could come about in a country as an accidental by-product 
of international and transnational dealings. That includes the observations people 
make of and about political developments occurring inside other countries including 
their near neighbours - as captured by such terms as the demonstration effect, 
democratization by emulation, and (somewhat perversely given that democracy 
normally has such positive normative connotations), ‘contagion’. All these are part of 
the international dimensions of democratization. They are not insignificant.  
 
A second important distinction is between the direct promotion of democracy, 
which involves political strategies, approaches or methods aimed directly at political 
objectives, and more indirect strategies that have the same overall goal of democracy 
but approach it sideways or through mediating channels.6 Attempts to contribute to 
the non-political requisites and preconditions that enable or facilitate and encourage 
democratization illustrate the indirect line of approach.  Aiding a country’s economic 
or socio-economic development is a major example. Furthering economic 
liberalization or marketization might be another. All four of the following 
permutations are possible: active direct promotion; active indirect promotion; passive 
direct promotion; passive indirect promotion. And in principle anti-democratic 
versions of all four permutations are possible too.  
 
Under the direct umbrella democracy is actively promoted in a number of 
ways, by using different instruments, approaches or methods. These range from 
influence and persuasion (sometimes called social learning) and ‘soft power’, through 
forms of pressure (for instance by shifting the terms of engagement from ‘diplomatic 
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dialogue’ to ‘diplomatic pressure’) to threats (or the application) of negative 
economic and financial conditionalities and other penalties for non-compliance. 
Beyond economic sanctions lie the more extreme applications of ‘leverage‘, notably 
hard power’ in the form of physical coercion. The correct positioning of positive 
conditionalities (that is, conditional incentives) along this scale can be debated, as can 
those forms of socialisation that do not employ normative suasion but instead seek to 
elicit behavioural conformity through cost-benefit calculation (for example weighing 
the international reputational costs of being seen to reject democracy against the 
increase in international legitimacy that can come from laying claim to democratic 
aspirations. While appearances may seem to be everything, even so a regime may 
become trapped into making substantive democratic concessions). The various 
instruments or approaches to promoting democracy are probably rarely used in 
isolation. They tend to be used in parallel or combination either by the same 
democracy promoter or by promoters collectively, either at a single point in time or 
when employed in sequence over a period of time. Judgments made about the political 
situation in the ‘target’ country and its assumed political trajectory will be important 
determinants. 
 
One of the most tangible and direct forms of democracy promotion is 
democracy assistance - the third important distinction. Democracy assistance 
comprises offers of practical, technical, financial and other support in the form of 
democracy programmes and projects that are invariably grant-supported and, usually, 
consensual. As such they are the soft option in democracy promotion: they are 
contributory to what Levitsky and Way call ‘linkage’ - or general ties to the West - as 
distinct from ‘leverage’.7  They inhabit only the active and direct category of 
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democracy promotion. However, in so far as projects like those for capacity-building 
in civil society or strengthening the pro-democracy political opposition form part of 
the approach to countries with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, the border 
between what is consensual (acceptable to the government) and non-consensual can 
be very fuzzy. The closer assistance to groups who are struggling to advance 
democratic reform is harnessed to external pressure on the government to allow more 
domestic political space in which such groups can mobilise popular support (which is 
a strategy that Thomas Carothers and some others at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace have argued for)8, then the further the democracy promotion 
moves away from soft democracy assistance and towards a harder approach to 
intervention.    
 
Promoting Democracy Backwards: a Typology 
 
Non-assistance and Non-promotion 
 
While generally-speaking the normative requirement to justify their stance might have 
shifted towards politicians who argue against the promotion of democracy, not all 
democracies invest great energy, finance or political capital in promoting democracies 
abroad.9 Needless to say they do more than the non-democracies, merely by choosing 
to be democracies. But not all countries with authoritarian and semi-authoritarian 
regimes (or, in Freedom House terminology, not free and only partly free states) 
receive much by way of democracy assistance, or are targeted resolutely and 
consistently by international democracy promotion actors. At least some of the 
orphans are deserving cases - that is to say the political oppression is great and the 
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people desperately need help - and some of the cases are meritorious in the sense that 
external support might not be futile, and could have productive consequences. 
 
Nevertheless it is important to distinguish where non-preferment is the product 
of deliberation from all the other circumstances where the explanation is unthinking 
neglect or miscalculation or the discipline enforced by resource constraints. The 
special combination of technical know-how, organisational ability and diplomatic 
skills that certain forms of democracy assistance require are not in infinitely elastic 
supply. Both the capacity of some potential candidate countries to absorb democracy 
assistance and the ability of democracy promoters to supply appropriate support are 
limited. The complexities of getting it right are magnified in divided societies 
emerging from violent internal conflict and where state capacity is fragile or weak.10 
The exercise of restraint on democracy promotion and assistance in these 
circumstances could be a blessing even if it happens as a result of donor meanness or 
a realpolitik calculation that the country is of no special interest.  
 
Perverse Assistance and Perverse Promotion 
This category refers to well-intentioned but misguided attempts to assist and promote 
democracy, where the efforts turn out to be counter-productive. 
 
On the one side there is assistance that is ill judged, technically flawed, badly planned 
or poorly executed, for example an international elections observation mission that the 
election winners use to claim an international seal of approval for an electoral process 
that was far from free or fair. Perverse assistance chimes with the criticism by 
Carothers and others that a good deal of democracy assistance has concentrated on 
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transferring material institutions without taking the trouble to consider how such 
institutions can be made to function for democracy in an alien environment. Put 
differently, democracy assistance that is not grounded in a valid theory of 
democratization – in reflections that explain how democracies come about - will at 
best not be very effective and at worst may be harmful to the democratic cause.   
 
Similarly there are democracy assistance interventions that are beneficial to certain 
democratic objectives but at the same time have negative externalities for some other 
democratic objectives, such that on balance the overall net effect is harmful. For 
example Sardamov argues that notwithstanding the orthodox view that civil society is 
healthy for democracy there are societies where external support to it hampers the 
development of the deeper, longer-term social processes and transformation of human 
personality that are essential to the democratic representation of differentiated social 
interests.11 So, not less than with conventional economic forms of international 
development cooperation, democracy assistance projects are vulnerable to familiar 
shortcomings like fungibility (where assistance ends up giving support to activities or 
purposes inconsistent with the original intention) and ‘recoil effects’ that do harm to 
the local partner, such as when support to a civic organisation causes it to become a 
target for increased harassment and repression by the authorities.12 Capacity-building 
efforts that serve only to make partners more dependent on and oriented to the 
international democracy promotion actors and their agendas may be just as damaging 
in their own way. 
 
On the other side there is poor strategy, an absence of strategy even, in the 
sense of failure to consider the best combination of methods, instruments or 
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approaches and timing that will promote democracy in the circumstances of a 
particular case. An example would be an over-reliance on economic sanctions to 
move a government to change its ways accompanied by too little thought given to the 
positive incentives that might work even better - and which would not undermine the 
economic conditions for durable democratic success. Taking sides in a domestic 
struggle for political change in a way that polarises and prolongs the conflict or 
prevents an internal accommodation on reform being reached would be another 
example. Yet another involves creating an expectation among pro-democracy activists 
that they will receive strong international support – something that US Ambassador 
Palmer reckons is particularly important to ousting the world’s last dictators – and 
then letting them down.13 Apart from damaging the prospects for democratic reform 
in that country it sends a dispiriting message to would-be reformers in other countries 
too. If Turkey’s ambition to join the EU is ultimately frustrated as a result of 
opposition from some EU member states, then that could yet undo some of the 
positive steps for democracy and human rights that EU pressure inter alia has helped 
bring about in recent years. 
 
Finally, apart from poorly thought out or badly implemented democracy 
promotion and democracy assistance there is the danger that can be done by over-
selling democracy as a cure for all problems – a mistake that can only lead to 
disappointment which in turn may diminish the commitment to reform in prospective 
new democracies. Whether construed as a strategy for national security in the 
democracy promoting countries or instrumentalised in the ‘target’ countries as a 
gateway to economic development or increased inflows of development aid, there is 
much potential for disillusionment to set in.  By comparison promoting democracy 
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purely on the strength of its own political value and ethical strength could be the least 
risky if not also the most alluring marketing technique.  
 
In reality the full extent of the problems that arise under perverse examples of 
democracy assistance and promotion is impossible to gauge. The evaluation of 
democracy assistance in particular remains a very imprecise art, bedevilled by doubts 
over when to attribute causality and the choice of yardsticks against which to assess 
impact and effectiveness. Impact evaluations in particular are notoriously difficult. 
Measuring the effectiveness (ineffectiveness, or perverse effects) of all the other 
approaches to promoting democracy rests on even shallower social scientific 
foundations. The literature offers contrasting findings from studying sanctions for 
example, which in some cases they are thought to have prolonged resistance, and 
conditionality. The respective contributions made directly by EU external pressure on 
prospective new member states and the empowering consequences that such pressure 
- combined with direct practical support - has meant for pro-democracy reformers in 
certain EU accession candidate countries, remains very much the subject of an 
ongoing scholarly debate.14  Finally, not only is there a well-founded understanding 
that democracy is being actively promoted and welcomed for a variety of reasons 
many of them far from disinterested or idealistic, on both sides of the relationship, but 
protestations to the contrary seem bound to stoke cynicism or disbelief – neither being 
helpful to democracy promotion. 
 
Anti-assistance and Counter-promotion 
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These are activities that are intentionally adverse to the democratic goal of promoting 
democracy. They comprise an active form, a passive form, and perhaps most 
challenging of all to identify, an intermediate category. 
 
The active form comprises endeavours that are intended to prevent, frustrate, oppose 
or hollow-out movement in a democratic direction or are intended to have democratic 
reversal as an effect. It is easy to think of actions by governments in some of the 
world’s more authoritarian states that would come into this category of democracy 
subversion, such as when China or President Putin provide political, diplomatic and 
practical support to governments in non–democracies like Belarus and Myanmar. 
However there is also evidence that democracies too engage in such deliberated 
practice – under the influence of countervailing interests that guide their foreign 
policies and the way they conceive their national interest. The importance to national 
security of maintaining this or that friendly dictator in power is one obvious 
illustration. Another comes from subservience to particularistic sub-national interests 
at home, where the completion of lucrative business dealings rests on allowing an 
illiberal regime or undemocratic government to stay the course. Familiar cases 
involve support for General Musharraf in Pakistan and autocratic rulers in oil-rich 
Gulf states, alongside with examples of arms exports to governments of dubious 
democratic or human rights credentials. However the harm done to human rights for 
example following the extension of practical help to the intelligence service or 
military and polices forces of a country where the rule of law is not absolute may not 
be tantamount to damage done to democracy. Final judgment in such matters must 
rest on how relations of interdependence between democracy, human rights and 
governance are understood both generally and in the specific instance.  
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 The role of China and Putin’s Russia apart, there is some evidence that living 
in a bad neighbourhood can be harmful to ‘democratization in one country’, although 
the reasons may not be straightforward. But even here it may be useful to distinguish 
between on the one side deliberate attempts to undermine democracy or derail 
democratization in a neighbouring country, perhaps as a strategy of self-defence by a 
regime minded to issue a pre-emptive strike against the chances that its own people 
might end up importing the impulse to political reform, and on the other side 
situations where democratization is inhibited or retarded simply because of a fear 
(rational or otherwise) that change might provoke external intervention in the country. 
Different again is where an external demonstration effect (from a failed democratic 
transition, for instance), linkage or ‘soft power’ just happen to transmit influences 
biased in an anti-democratic direction. For example the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union following political liberalisation under Gorbachev sent a clear signal to the 
rulers of China. Similarly the instability in post-Saddam Iraq may be read as a 
warning against attempting substantial political reform by peoples elsewhere in the 
Middle East.  These illustrations of negative social learning (‘inoculation’) are 
examples not of the active form but of the passive direct form of democracy counter-
promotion. 
 
A distinctive sub-category of active counter-promotion for which examples 
may be more hypothetical than real is counter-absorption - the mirror image of 
Whitehead’s observation that in a few instances territorial incorporation has been 
responsible for extending democracy’s coverage.15 He cited the addition of Hawaii 
and the still not fully incorporated Puerto Rico into the United States, and the 
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reunification of Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as post-war illustrations. If 
communist China were to take control of democratic Taiwan that would be an 
example of counter-absorption. A different kind of example, perhaps better given the 
name perverse absorption, would be if Korean reunification badly damaged South 
Korean democracy notwithstanding the fact that South Korea, like West Germany vis-
à-vis the German Democratic Republic, is the stronger ‘partner’ in almost every 
respect. The accession of European states to the European Union does not strictly 
provide an example of the full political absorption of countries into an undemocratic 
state. But as more states in South-east Europe and perhaps Turkey too join the EU 
questions are bound to be asked in those countries about the democratic consequences 
of exchanging some of their former sovereign independence for inclusion in a larger 
European political arrangement that has its own distinctive democratic deficit.  
 
The intermediate category of anti-assistance and counter-promotion includes contact 
and relations where the adverse effects for democratization were not purposeful but 
nevertheless could reasonably have been anticipated and decisions could - perhaps 
should - have been taken to mitigate the chances of producing harmful effects. In 
these situations claims to ignorance offer no defence when the collateral democratic 
damage occurs, and protestations of being uninterested in these consequences could 
be objectionable. This category is probably the most contentious but possibly the most 
interesting one of all. It is a challenging exercise to identify clear examples. This is 
not simply because commentators may well not agree about which international actors 
should have known what, the degree of understanding and the foresight they should 
possess and their moral and political (if not also legal) liability to take account of all 
the possible consequences of their actions. It is also because the way international 
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borders of all descriptions are becoming more porous or are being dissolved in this 
increasingly globalized world of time and space compression means that even ‘purely 
domestic’ or internal affairs in one country or group of countries can have notable 
consequences a long way away. 
 
For example at one end of the scale we can examine the precise extent to 
which the long chain of miscalculations that US policy is said to have made in 
invading Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein and then continued during the American- 
British occupation immediately afterwards could have been avoided, in the interests 
of building stable democracy in Iraq later.16 At the other end lie the domestic sources 
of what Nye calls ‘soft power’, more specifically his reference to the attractiveness of 
a country’s (specifically the US’s) ‘culture, political ideals and policy’.17 How far the 
central authorities in any liberal democracy can be held responsible for the ‘culture’ 
and ‘political ideals’ of the country is an intriguing question (the direction of causality 
is just as likely to run the other way), especially in a federal country with deeply 
entrenched traditions of political rights and civil liberties like the US. Similarly the 
European Commission’s ability to determine the influence that flows to the rest of the 
world from what goes on inside the EU member states is extremely limited. 
Nevertheless, certain examples of domestic policy may be sufficiently malleable by 
government agency to be candidates for this intermediate category of democracy 
counter-promotion. Thus for instance in the US Nye cites the permissive laws on gun 
control and capital punishment as cases where foreign perceptions possibly weaken 
the capability of US ‘soft power’ to promote liberal democratic values abroad. And in 
Europe the financial scandals involving political parties that surface periodically in 
for example Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain cannot but send unfortunate signals 
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overseas. They tarnish the efforts made by political parties in these countries to share 
advice on legitimate fund-raising techniques with new parties in emerging 
democracies, which is an example of democracy assistance. Bribery by multinational 
companies in return for government favours is an even more blatant example of 
democracy counter-promotion where various OECD governments may be held 
responsible for not taking adequate preventative and disciplinary measures soon 
enough. This brings us back to the international behaviour of western actors and the 
governments in particular. 
 
So a yet further distinctive example of this intermediate category - and one 
that illustrates well the difficulties of assigning responsibility - is supplied by 
Carothers’ account of the current backlash against democracy promotion. He claims 
this is the direct result of the way democracy’s enemies abroad are able to conflate 
democracy promotion with the forcible pursuit of ‘regime change’ in Afghanistan and 
Iraq - military adventures that in the first instance were about goals other than the 
promotion of democracy in those two countries.18  The invasions have armed anti-
democrats around the world with a pretext for mobilising popular support against 
many forms of genuine democracy intervention. They can present democracy 
intervention as a threat to government, state and country, thereby exploiting the 
grounds of sovereignty and emphasising a national imperative to resist foreign 
imperialism. In some measure then the examples in this intermediate category of 
counter-promotion are locally constructed – constructed by the opportunistic 
responses that non-democrats make to what they judge are threats to themselves. To 
what extent that sort of thing could be anticipated and whether the liberal democracies 
should adjust how they go about doing things are both debatable questions. The 
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second one in particular could risk giving encouragement to game playing on all 
sides. But a general inference that would go further than Levitsky and Way’s 
conclusion that because there are limits to the power of leverage linkage offers an 
essential complement, 19  is that perceptions (distorted or otherwise and irrespective of 
how deliberate) of excessive uses of hard power by liberal democracies in their 
external relations might actually undermine soft power – producing sub-optimal 
consequences for democracy promotion. In Whitehead’s words this coercive 
imposition by outside force - whether the US, the UN or some other external actor – is 
the turning point where ‘the claims of popular sovereignty tend to clash with 
democratization viewed as an international project’.20   
 
Of course in all such cases hindsight is a wonderful thing; and it is inevitable 
that arguments will persist over what could (not) have been foreseen easily and what 
would (not) have been preventable. What is done is done. But as is true with perverse 
promotion and assistance also, failure to learn the lessons and where possible make 
appropriate alterations in policy behaviour must be regrettable from the perspective of 
democracy promotion.  
 
The passive form of anti-assistance and counter-promotion includes contacts and 
relations by the outside world that prove harmful to democratization but were framed 
by other reasonings, objectives or goals and were not intended by anyone to be hostile 
to democracy. In many of these cases the actors could claim with some legitimacy 
that the democracy effects (good or bad) are none of their business. While not the 
whole of it, this occupies mainly the realm of indirect promotion of democracy 
backwards.  
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 An illustration from the world of non-democracies is the influence that 
China’s growing economic power and political diplomacy is said to be exercising 
increasingly not just in parts of Asia but elsewhere as well. For example it should not 
be difficult to model the impact of each extra dollar on the price of a barrel of 
internationally traded oil which owes to bourgeoning energy demands from China, on 
prolonging the life of authoritarian oil rentier states in the Middle East especially. 
Similarly there has been much talk recently of China’s influence in Africa, where 
rulers like Uganda’s President Museveni have openly welcomed the greater freedom 
from the West that increasing economic and financial ties with China seems likely to 
bring. China’s pursuit of its own interests rather than any desire to campaign against 
democracy abroad clearly lies at the heart of such developments.  And after all, the 
West is complicit in China’s increasing integration into the global economy and 
accompanying rise in stature. Nevertheless, it is easy to see where the attraction lies 
for governments that want to resist external pressures to democratize. And 
Kurlantzick has drawn attention to China’s success in promoting an idea of the world 
where nations do not aggressively interfere in one another’s affairs.21 Nevertheless, a 
focus such as this on the influence of one state like China, whether direct or indirect 
influence, shares the weakness of all other actor-based frameworks of analysis - a 
distraction from large structural features or trends in the international system that lie 
within the category of indirect effects and make a notable contribution to promoting 
democracy backwards. Two manifestations will be mentioned here. 
 
First, there is the influence of those structural forces in the global economy 
that have the effect of retarding or undermining economic development in a country, 
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together with any which may have as their consequence increased inequalities in the 
distribution of income and wealth not just between countries but within countries.  
After all, the proposition that stable democracy benefits from economic development 
remains the closest thing we have to an ‘iron law’, even though democratic transition 
can happen in its absence and high levels of development are not absolutely necessary 
(or sufficient) for sustainable democracy. Also there is the well established 
understanding that the distribution of political power and influence broadly tracks the 
distribution of economic and social resources. And so notwithstanding the formal 
political equality that might be enshrined in a liberal democracy’s system of political 
rights and civil liberties, significant de facto inequalities among citizens can follow 
from socio-economic inequalities – defeating the purposes of liberal democracy 
promotion, let alone placing other more radical forms of democracy far beyond reach. 
The proposition that economic development whose benefits are shared by society as a 
whole is one of the surest guarantors of democratic sustainability, and the companion 
idea that economic growth (or decline) accompanied by absolute poverty and gross 
socio-economic inequality will weaken the quality and sustainability of democracy, 
remain among the most often tested and widely accepted beliefs in the literature on 
democratization. Hence the concern that is currently being expressed by some 
commentators over the future of democracy in Latin America for instance, which 
owes precisely to the economic and socio-economic trends there. The predisposition 
of neo-liberal and market economics to produce further inequality also seems 
indisputable, as is the increasing extension of neo-liberal economic institutions at all 
levels - local, national, international and supranational. Democracy loses vital 
support; would-be dictators take encouragement. In some parts of the US government 
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and in the US National Endowment for Democracy too Venezuela under President 
Chávez would be offered as an example and a warning. 
 
Secondly, and perhaps more arguably belonging within the passive form of 
democracy counter promotion, there is globalization understood as the growth in 
global and regional governance, multi-level governance and polycentrism. Increasing 
power over peoples’ lives is coming to be exercised by institutions that are neither 
internally democratic nor democratically accountable to the world community of 
states.  As a site of political self-determination the national state is increasingly 
exposed to the trans-territorial and supra-territorial governance of a bewildering array 
of inter-governmental and non-governmental institutions. And while a substantial 
debate exists over the extent to which the power of the state is simply transforming - 
or being transformed - in the presence of these developments rather than being eroded 
or taken away, there is little disagreement that the state-challenging (and thereby 
democracy-threatening) effects are likely to be more problematic in many parts of the 
developing world. That is where most of the emerging and prospective new 
democracies and similar candidates for democracy promotion are to be found.  
Countries that are heavily reliant on grant-aided support from the international 
financial institutions, the Bretton Woods institutions especially seem particularly at 
risk. So are small countries with too little bargaining clout or technical expertise to be 
able to stand up for their individual interests in bodies like the World Trade 
Organisation.   
 
That over the long run globalization and liberal democracy may be at odds has 
of course been said many times before.22 But social scientists still say remarkably 
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little about how democracy can be preserved let alone enhanced in a more globalized 
future, and democracy assistance practitioners have not even begun to pose the 
relevant questions. They have certainly not got as far as adapting what they do and the 
way they do things in order to meet the main challenges to democracy that are 
endemic to a globalizing world.23 In the meantime, pessimistic views about 
globalization’s potential to undermine democracy (reinforcing and reinforced by 
negative social learning from the established democracies) could fuel a self-fulfilling 
momentum, whereby democracy loses its lustre, its power to attract and the ability to 
inspire wholehearted popular support.  In an even more sinister but equally plausible 
scenario some governments actively take advantage of globalization’s pressures in 
ways that concentrate executive power further and increase the state’s autonomy vis-
à-vis citizens and society, even as certain powers are being surrendered abroad. And 
the reaction of governments to the anti-globalization protests made by social 
movements and other groups in society takes the form of an increasingly illiberal 
response – tighter restrictions on peaceful demonstrations, increased use of closed 
circuit television surveillance and the like. At the same time, the authorities may 
genuinely be unable to control the activities of even more threatening transnational 
actors who, by taking advantage of porous borders penetrate the domestic economic, 
social and political spaces. Examples are international criminal gangs such as those 
involved in the trafficking of illicit drugs and the sex trade. Of course the 
dissemination of democratic values around the world and sharpening of the appetite 
for freedom as a result of international democracy promotion activities offer examples 
of a much more positive sort. 
So finally there is the cultural dimension of globalization, which dwells on the 
diffusion of values, attitudes and inclinations. By downgrading the norms, principles 
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and sentiments of freedom and democracy some of these highly mobile cultural 
products could well constitute threats to democratization almost anywhere. In broad 
terms this refers to socialisation into an already pervasive culture of material 
consumption, which is so compelling as to cause indifference to politics and an 
extreme form of individualism to take the place of an interest in serving the public 
good, that is, active forms of good citizenship. As a mindset and pattern of behaviour 
capable of doing damage to democracy and its prospects the potency of this should 
not be underestimated, even if the competing cultures of Islamic fundamentalism, 
nationalist xenophobia and outmoded revolutionary socialism between them will only 
turn the heads of but a few. Once again, however, the anti-democratic potential that 
further developments in global media and mass communications might stimulate or 
reveal through their effects on cultural change is easier to state than it is to know how 
the concerned promoters of democracy should respond.  
 
What is in a Typology? 
 
Typologies are not theories. However they can be an aid to theory construction – in 
this case to explaining how exogenous variables can do harm to democratization, and 
the different ways. The scope exists to inquire more closely into the precise 
relationships between different international dimensions of democratization and 
exactly how democracy’s progress is affected, in what ways and to what extent. While 
only very modest claims can be made for the typology of promoting democracy 
backwards offered here, the implications for both analysts and practitioners of 
international democracy promotion are worth noting even so. International politics is 
characterised by nothing if not by asymmetry. It may well be ‘doubtful whether an 
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international initiative can create a democratic regime’ even where ‘local conditions 
are favourable, international consensus is strong, and adequate resources are 
provided’.24 But the chances of firm agreement on the exact opposite are far more 
credible: there are international dimensions that may be harmful to democratization 
and do considerable harm to a democracy, especially a fragile or fledgling regime.  
Looking forwards then, the following inferences should be borne in mind. 
 
First, the typology helps place the democracy promotion industry in 
perspective. Not only has democracy assistance undergone considerable growth in the 
number of actors but recent years have also seen considerable interest shown by 
academics and other independent commentators alike. Any quick count of relevant 
articles and books now in print would bear that out. However, not only are the total 
financial resources committed to democracy assistance still rather small (no-one 
knows the true annual figure but the world-wide total for democratic governance is 
certainly not more than US$10 billion expenditure, even now, compared with around 
$100 billion of official development assistance in 2005), but the forces pushing the 
other way are many, varied, and large.  Notwithstanding its successes, the scale of 
democracy assistance approximates to ‘spitting in the wind’. 
 
Second, if developed in greater detail the typology could attune seasoned democracy 
promoters – and their backers - more closely to what they can do and the limits of the 
possible. More realistic planning could be a beneficiary, for an activity where 
traditionally an absence of strategy or only poor strategy have been bemoaned by 
‘insiders’ and outside commentators alike. The ever-present danger of being 
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portrayed as having promised more than can actually be delivered is more likely to be 
avoided. That too would be a plus. 
 
Third, the idea of promoting democracy is transported to a different plane and will 
find application in a larger set of forums, once the concrete activities of democracy 
assistance are contextualised by reference to the immeasurably greater structural and 
institutional forces at work in the world today. Anyone seriously committed to seeing 
democracy make gains should reflect closely on where to direct their attention and 
energies and on what their overall strategy for promoting democracy should be. 
Rather like the question that for many years cropped up in popular campaigns against 
world poverty (Jubilee 2000 for instance) – ‘which is more likely to maximise the 
chances of making a meaningful difference, another new aid project or lobbying the 
World Bank to cancel third world debt?’ – so similar conundrums must be addressed 
in the field of democracy promotion too.  Externalising responsibility for democracy 
promotion to the agencies of democracy assistance is at best but a half-hearted 
response, at worst, pure deceit. 
 
Fourth, then, the democracy assistance organisations cannot go it alone. Even 
with bigger budgets the likes of USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, 
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, Germany’s political foundations, the 
vehicles chosen by the European Union and all the rest can hope to achieve only so 
much. Even the UN’s new Democracy Fund and the growing budget of the United 
Nations Development Programme may be able to do little more than ‘plough the sea’. 
The undercurrents promoting democracy backwards may be faster and deeper than the 
more visible forwards movements, even as we speak. So not only would a more 
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joined-up approach to thinking be worth aiming for, but both a more inclusive and 
better coordinated approach to action by the different actors in the foreign policy and 
international affairs establishments - governmental departments and non-departmental 
bodies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations  - would be helpful. 
The multifaceted nature of ‘democratization backwards’ suggests that the 
requirements of democracy promotion merit an appropriately multidimensional 
response.   
 
Finally and especially in regard to the way international sites of power are being 
constructed and reconfigured beyond the old system of sovereign states, imaginative 
new thinking is required over how to invest democratic values, principles and 
practices in the structures of global and regional governance that are liable to make 
democratic gains at the national and local levels look rather hollow. Otherwise 
formal advances of liberal democracy may still take place and yet leave behind a good 
deal of what people in the oldest such democracies used to take for granted as its very 
substance.  
 
Final Reflections 
 
The surest sign that democracy promotion and protection have arrived as subjects 
capable of arousing considerable interest is that abbreviations - DPP – have started to 
become an institution in the literature. But we should not let this evident enthusiasm 
carry us away. Close observers mostly agree that democracy promotion’s actual 
record of achievement has been modest. And that there will always be some failures 
in democracy promotion is inevitable. Devising an ‘early warning system’ to detect 
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the erosion of unsteady new democracies from within, so that timely corrective 
measures can be instigated by international actors, is one thing to aim for. But the 
evidence of international factors actually contributing to democracy prevention, 
hollowing-out, reversal and destruction is also a matter of some urgency. The subject 
warrants closer investigation even if that means shifting attention away from actors 
with ostensible responsibility for promoting democracy and towards structures of 
power embedded in the global political economy, in other words their negative 
implications for democracy and the promotion of democracy.  
 
Rose and Shin in their account of ‘democratization backwards’ posited something like 
liberal democracy as the most optimistic of the three possible final outcomes. It is 
achieved almost in spite of the path taken in democratization, because society is so 
committed to making it happen. Comparable speculations that liberal democracies 
will continue to proliferate notwithstanding democracy promotion – that promoting 
democracy will inspire societies to struggle for liberal democracy with greater 
determination and bring a strong sense of ownership in its wake - are no less 
intriguing and just as attractive. At the present time, however, events in the real world 
justify no such confidence. Although not in the sense that Rose and Shin intended, 
something like a ‘low level equilibrium trap’ could be the future that awaits 
democracy assistance and the active direct promotion of democracy. This is bound to 
be the case if those involved in the industry dwell only on the more parochial 
weaknesses and, like the rest of the world ignore the overall impact and the larger 
international forces promoting democracy backwards. There are implications for 
think-tanks and academia too. The analysis here suggests the time has now come not 
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just for the practice of democracy promotion to widen its lens but for studies of it to 
broaden their horizons too.  
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